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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Whorton v. Bockting,1 the Supreme Court considered whether 
its rule from Crawford v. Washington,2 prohibiting the admission of 
testimonial hearsay statements without a prior opportunity for the 
defendant to cross-examine the declarant, should be applied 
retroactively to cases on collateral appeal under the standard set forth 
in Teague v. Lane.3 The determination rested on whether Crawford 
announced a “new rule” that should be applied retroactively by virtue 
of its being a “watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the 
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”4 In a 
unanimous decision, the Court held that Crawford did announce a 
“new rule” of criminal procedure, but that “this rule does not fall 
within the Teague exception for watershed rules.”5 Therefore, the 
respondent could not benefit from the Crawford rule during the 
collateral review of his original state court conviction. 
The outcome of the case was not surprising given the high bar the 
Court has set for finding a watershed rule in decisions after Teague. 
Since the Teague standard was announced, the Court has not found a 
single rule that satisfies its requirements.6 However, prior to the 
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 1. Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007). 
 2. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 35 (2004). 
 3. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 4. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. at 1181(quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)). 
 5. Id. at 1184. 
 6. See, e.g., Schiro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (rejecting retroactivity for Ring v. 
Arizona, 546 U.S. 584 (2002)); Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004) (rejecting retroactivity for 
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988)); O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151 (1997) (rejecting 
retroactivity for Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994)); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 
333 (1993) (rejecting retroactivity for a new rule relating to jury instructions on homicide); 
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decision, some commentators thought that this case might be that 
“rare blockbuster” that was able to satisfy the strict requirements of 
Teague and qualify for retro-application to cases on collateral review.7 
Indeed, Bockting’s attorney, Nevada Public Defender Franny 
Forsman, remarked, “The reason that no new rule has been held to 
apply retroactively since Teague is because the court has not seen this 
case.”8 The Court’s unanimous and authoritative decision therefore 
has implications beyond this particular case. If the Crawford rule was 
not a watershed rule, what is? 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The facts of the case illustrate the dilemma judges face when 
trying to balance the Sixth Amendment right of criminal defendants 
to confront the witnesses against them with society’s interest in 
protecting abused children from the potential trauma of facing their 
alleged abusers in court. 
Marvin Bockting lived in Las Vegas with his wife, Laura, their 
three-year-old daughter, Honesty, and Laura’s six-year-old daughter, 
Autumn, from a previous relationship.9 Within the close quarters of 
the family’s rented motel room, the six-year-old Autumn obtained 
sexual knowledge beyond her years, having taken showers with Laura 
and Marvin and witnessed them having sex on several occasions.10 
On January 16, 1988, while Bockting was away from the residence, 
Autumn woke up crying. According to Laura’s testimony during the 
trial, Autumn told her that Bockting had repeatedly put his “pee-pee 
in her pee-pee,” that he had put his “pee-pee in her butt,” that he 
made her “suck his pee-pee like a sucker” until “white bubbly stuff” 
came out into her mouth, and that “he put his chin on her pee-pee.”11 
 
Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990) (rejecting retroactivity for Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 
320 (1985)). 
 7. See, e.g., Professor Robert Mosteller, Remarks at Duke Law School Program in Public 
Law Panel on Upcoming Supreme Court Term (Aug. 28, 2004). Summary available at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/features/2006/supremecourtterm.html (last visited March 4, 2007). 
 8. Posting of Franny Forsman to The Confrontation Blog, 
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2006/05/supreme-court-to-decide-retroactivity.html (May 
15, 2006, 20:22 EST). 
 9. Brief of Petitioner, Whorton v. Bockting, No. 05-595, 2006 WL 2066492, at 3. (Jul. 19, 
2006) [hereinafter Petitioner’s Brief]. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.  These quotes are taken from Laura’s testimony at trial. 
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When Bockting came home the next morning, Laura confronted him, 
but not before first asking him for the rent money and leaving him 
alone with the girls while she left to pay the rent.12 Bockting denied 
having touched Autumn and when Laura said she was taking the child 
to the doctor to be checked, Bockting encouraged her to do so.13 
Bockting voluntarily left the residence. As he was leaving, Autumn 
seemed distraught and wanted to hug and kiss him.14 
Two days later, Laura took Autumn to the hospital and a 
gynecologist examined the child. The examining doctor later testified 
that she found a recent tear in the rectal sphincter and a wide opening 
in the hymenal ring, injuries that were consistent with “blunt force” 
trauma.15 She also testified that these injuries would have caused pain, 
particularly during urination. However, there was no testimony that 
Autumn was in any pain leading up to the examination.16 
At the hospital, a police detective attempted to interview Autumn, 
but Autumn was too distraught to explain what happened and said 
only that someone had hurt her.17 However, two days later the 
detective again met with Autumn and this time was able to speak to 
her at length, in the company of her mother. Autumn described what 
happened to her in the same way she had earlier conveyed it to Laura. 
She also demonstrated the incidents in great detail using anatomically 
correct dolls.18 Following this interview, Bockting was arrested and 
charged with four counts of sexual assault on a minor under the age 
of fourteen.19 
At Bockting’s preliminary hearing, Autumn appeared to testify. 
However, when the prosecutor began questioning her about the 
incidents of abuse, she became very upset and her statements lost 
consistency. Still, the trial court was persuaded that there was 
sufficient evidence to hold Bockting for trial.20 Prior to the start of 
trial, the court held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether 
 
 12. Brief of Respondent, Whorton v. Bockting, No. 05-595, 2006 WL 2736637, at 3. (Sep. 
20, 2006). [hereinafter Respondent’s Brief]. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Petitioner’s Brief at 3. 
 15. Id. at 4. 
 16. Respondent’s Brief at 4. 
 17. Petitioner’s Brief at 4. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1177 (2007). 
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Autumn could testify. Because she was again too distressed to take 
the stand, the court declared her unavailable and granted the State’s 
motion, over Bockting’s objection, to allow Laura and the detective to 
recount her pretrial statements.21 The court invoked a Nevada statute 
that allowed out-of-court statements made by a child under ten 
describing a sexual assault to be admitted if the court finds that the 
child is unavailable to testify and that “circumstances of the statement 
provide sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.”22 
The trial court’s ruling was consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Ohio v. Roberts.23 There, the Court held that the 
Confrontation Clause24 permits the admission of prior hearsay 
statements, as long as the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial 
and the statement “bears adequate indicia of reliability.”25 The Court 
noted that the hearsay statement may be found reliable if it fits within 
a firmly rooted hearsay exception, or if there are “particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness”26 working in its favor. In Bockting’s 
case, there was no firmly rooted hearsay exception involved, but the 
trial court allowed the hearsay statements because they were attended 
by particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. As the Nevada 
Supreme Court later found, several factors, including the “natural 
spontaneity” of Autumn’s first description of the assaults, the level of 
detail in which she described them, the consistency of her story when 
related to the detective four days later, and her use of anatomically 
correct dolls, all counseled for the admission of her hearsay 
statements.27 
At the end of the three-day trial, the jury found Bockting guilty on 
three counts of sexual assault on a minor and sentenced him to serve 
two consecutive life sentences and a concurrent life sentence, all with 
the possibility of parole.28 After exhausting his state remedies, 
Bockting sought habeas corpus relief in federal court pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that his Confrontation Clause rights were 
 
 21. Petitioner’s Brief at 4. 
 22. NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.2851(a) (2003). 
 23. Ohio v. Roberts, 488 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . 
. . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”). 
 25. Roberts, 488 U.S. at 66 (citations omitted). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Bockting v. State, 109 Nev. 103, 109–12 (1993) (per curiam). 
 28. Petitioner’s Brief at 5. 
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violated by the admission of the hearsay statements.29 The District 
Court denied Bockting’s petition, and Bockting appealed to the Ninth 
Circuit.30 
After oral arguments in the case, but before the Ninth Circuit 
made its decision, the United States Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Crawford v. Washington.31 Crawford abrogated the Roberts 
test, holding that testimonial statements from witnesses who do not 
appear at trial can be admitted “only where the declarant is 
unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine.”32 Justice Scalia, writing for a seven 
justice majority, wrote that Roberts had strayed from the original 
understanding of the Confrontation Clause and was too “malleable” 
in permitting ex parte testimonial statements.33 Rather than apply this 
“malleable” standard, the Court held that “[w]here testimonial 
evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth Amendment demands what the 
common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination.”34 
Clearly, under Crawford, Autumn Bockting’s hearsay statements 
would have been inadmissible because they were testimonial and 
Bockting had no prior opportunity to cross-examine her. But it was 
unclear whether the Crawford rule could be applied to Bockting’s 
case, which had been properly decided under the Court’s previous 
holding in Roberts. Thus, the Ninth Circuit panel requested 
supplemental briefing on the question of whether Crawford should be 
applied retroactively to Bockting’s appeal.35 The answer depended on 
whether Crawford constituted a “watershed rule of criminal 
procedure” under Teague v. Lane.36 
In Teague, the Supreme Court held that “[u]nless they fall within 
an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal 
procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become 
final before the new rules are announced.”37 The Teague Court 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 7. 
 31. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 35 (2004). 
 32. Id. at 59. 
 33. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 34. Id. at 67. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 37. Id. at 310. 
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recognized two exceptions to this general rule. First, it would only 
apply to new rules of procedural due process, and not to new rules of 
substantive due process, which affect “‘certain kinds of primary, 
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-
making authority to proscribe.’”38 Second, “a new rule should be 
applied retroactively if it requires the observance of ‘those procedures 
that . . . are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”39 Only 
“watershed rules of criminal procedure”40—those that are “central to 
an accurate determination of guilt”41—would qualify for the exception 
to the general rule. As for what qualifies as a “new” rule, the Court 
held that, “[i]n general . . . a case announces a new rule when it breaks 
new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal 
Government.”42 
In subsequent cases, the Court further explicated the second 
Teague exception, demarking two requirements for a rule to qualify as 
watershed: first, it must be necessary to prevent “an impermissibly 
large risk” of an inaccurate conviction;43 second, it must “alter our 
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the 
fairness of a proceeding.”44 The Court has repeatedly emphasized that 
the watershed exception is “extremely narrow”45 and that it is 
“‘unlikely’” that any watershed rules “‘ha[ve] yet to emerge.’”46 
Indeed, the Court has never found a rule to meet the watershed 
requirements. 
The Court has identified Gideon v. Wainwright47 as perhaps the 
only case that qualifies as formulating a watershed rule of criminal 
procedure.48 In Gideon, the Court held that the Sixth and Fourteenth 
 
 38. Id. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 39. Id. (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 40. Id. at 311. 
 41. Id. at 313. 
 42. Id. at 301. 
 43. Schiro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 356 (2004). 
 44. Id. 
 45. E.g., id. at  352. 
 46. Id. (quoting Tyler v. Cain, 353 U.S. 656 (2001)). 
 47. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 48. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417 (2004) (“This Court has yet to find a new 
rule that falls under this exception. In providing guidance as to what might do so, the Court has 
repeatedly, and only, referred to the right-to-counsel rule of Gideon v. Wainwright, which 
altered the Court's understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of 
a proceeding.” (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original); Saffle v. Parks, 
494 U.S. 484, 494 (1990); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 364 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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Amendments to the Constitution require that any indigent defendant 
charged with a felony be provided with counsel.49 In the post-Teague 
cases, the Court observed that Gideon qualified as a watershed rule 
because it “‘alter[ed] [the Court’s] understanding of the bedrock 
procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.’”50 The 
message to prisoners seeking to have new rules applied to their 
collateral appeals is that the source of the new rule must be 
comparable to Gideon, and distinguishable from the line of cases in 
which the court has refused to apply new rules retroactively. 
On appeal, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit agreed with 
Bockting’s argument that Crawford qualified as a Teague exception 
and should be applied retroactively to his case.51 A majority of two 
judges concluded that Crawford announced a new rule of criminal 
procedure, and a different majority of two judges concluded that the 
rule should have been applied in Bockting’s case because it fit within 
the Teague exception for watershed rules. Because the panel’s 
decision conflicted with those of every other Circuit Court and State 
Supreme Court to consider the issue of Crawford’s retroactivity, the 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.52 
III.  DECISION AND RATIONALE 
In a unanimous opinion the Court held that though Crawford 
announced a new rule of criminal procedure, it does not fall within 
the Teague v. Lane exception for watershed rules.53 The opinion was a 
somewhat routine application of Teague and its progeny, but it did 
clarify a few essential questions that had divided the Ninth Circuit 
panel. 
Justice Alito wrote the opinion of the Court and summarized the 
rule for retroactive application of new rules: 
Under the Teague framework, an old rule applies both on direct 
and collateral review, but a new rule is generally applicable only to 
cases that are still on direct review. A new rule applies 
retroactively only if (1) the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a 
 
 49. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344–45. 
 50. Beard, 542 U.S. at 407 (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990)) (brackets 
and emphasis in original). 
 51. Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 52. Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007). 
 53. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. at 1180. 
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‘watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure’ implicating the 
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.54 
Following this framework, the opinion addressed first whether 
Crawford formulated a new rule or merely applied an old rule; 
second, whether the new rule announced was procedural or 
substantive; and third, whether it qualifies as retroactive under either 
of the two Teague exceptions. 
With regard to the first question, Justice Alito defined a new rule 
as “a rule that . . . was not ‘dictated by precedent existing at the time 
the defendant’s conviction became final.’”55 Under this standard, 
Crawford clearly announced a new rule because it was not dictated by 
existing precedent.56 Justice Alito went further in suggesting that 
Crawford actually overruled Roberts, and thus must be considered a 
new rule.57 According to the Court, Judge Noonan of the Ninth 
Circuit—who had argued that Crawford merely applied an old rule—
erred in focusing on the holdings of prior Confrontation Clause 
decisions, rather than their rationales. Though the Crawford Court 
observed that prior holdings, including that from Roberts, had been 
consistent with the proper confrontation rule that Crawford was 
announcing, it also noted that the rationales of those cases had been 
inconsistent with the rule it was announcing.58 Because Crawford’s 
rationale broke with prior precedent, the Bockting court reasoned it 
was a new rule, and state courts applying the prior rule in good faith 
should not have their convictions disturbed unless the new rule was 
either substantive or a watershed rule of criminal procedure.59 
As for the first exception, the Court quickly held that “it is clear 
and undisputed that the [Crawford] rule is procedural and not 
substantive.”60 The Court then devoted the bulk of its analysis to the 
question of whether the Crawford rule might qualify under the 
second Teague exception as a watershed rule of criminal procedure. 
 
 54. Id. at 1180–1181 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990); Teague v. Lane, 489 
U.S. 288, 311 (1989)). 
 55. Id. at 1181 (quoting Saffle 494 U.S. at 488; Teague, 489 U.S. at 301) (emphasis in 
original). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. (citing Saffle, 494 U.S. at 488 (“The explicit overruling of an earlier holding no 
doubt creates a new rule.”)). 
 58. Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 35, 57–60 (2004)). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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The Court first emphasized the qualifying language of its holdings, 
that the watershed exception “is ‘extremely narrow,’”61 and that “it is 
‘“unlikely’ that any such rules ‘ha[ve] yet to emerge.’”62 The Court 
then provided another iteration of the watershed rule: 
In order to qualify as watershed, a new rule must meet two 
requirements. First, the rule must be necessary to prevent an 
impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction. Second, the 
rule must alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural 
elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.63 
The Court held that Crawford does not satisfy the first 
requirement because it does not prevent an impermissibly large risk 
of inaccurate conviction.64 The Court clarified that, in order for a new 
rule to satisfy this first requirement, “it is not enough to say that the 
rule is aimed at improving the accuracy of trial or that the rule is 
directed toward the enhancement of reliability and accuracy in some 
sense.”65 Rather, the rule must remedy an impermissibly large risk of 
an inaccurate conviction.66 
In this regard, the Court again identified Gideon v. Wainwright as 
the guidepost, noting that “[w]hen a defendant who wishes to be 
represented by counsel is denied representation . . . the risk of an 
unreliable verdict is intolerably high.”67 In contrast, the Crawford rule 
is far narrower in scope and its effect on the accuracy of a conviction 
is “far less direct and profound.”68 The Court noted that the reason 
Crawford overruled Roberts was not because it wished to improve the 
accuracy of fact finding in criminal trials, but rather because it wished 
to return to the original understanding of the Confrontation Clause.69 
Furthermore, as the majority wrote, it is far from clear that Crawford 
is a greater guarantor of accuracy than the pre-existing rule under 
Roberts. Though Crawford may have improved accuracy in criminal 
trials involving testimonial hearsay statements, it completely 
eliminated any Confrontation Clause protection of non-testimonial 
 
 61. Id. (quoting Schiro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004)). 
 62. Id. (quoting Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352, and Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001)). 
 63. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 64. Id. at 1182. 
 65. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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hearsay statements.70 Roberts had at least required that such 
statements be deemed reliable before being admitted. Because 
Crawford removed such statements from the scope of the 
Confrontation Clause and thus permits their admission without prior 
cross-examination even when there are no indicia of reliability, it does 
not seem to promote accuracy in these cases.71 
Thus, the effect of Crawford on the accuracy of the criminal fact-
finding process is a mixed bag: with respect to testimonial hearsay it 
may promote accuracy, but with respect to non-testimonial hearsay, it 
is actually less of a guarantor of accuracy than the earlier Roberts 
regime. In any event, the Court cautioned that its duty under Teague 
was not to weigh both sides and decide whether there is “some net 
improvement in the accuracy of fact finding in criminal cases.”72 
Rather, it was to determine whether the sort of testimony that would 
be admissible under Roberts “is so much more unreliable than that 
admissible under Crawford that the Crawford rule is ‘one without 
which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously 
diminished.’”73 The Court had no trouble finding that it was not. 
Although the Court had earlier stated that both requirements of 
the watershed exception must be met, and it had already decided that 
the first requirement was not, it went on to briefly discuss the second 
requirement as well. The Court of Appeals had erred in relying on the 
conclusion that the right of confrontation itself is a bedrock 
procedural rule. The proper inquiry is whether the new rule itself 
“constitute[s] a previously unrecognized bedrock procedural element 
that is essential to the fairness of a proceeding.”74 The Court again 
looked to Gideon for guidance in answering this question, and found 
that the Crawford rule, “while certainly important, is not in the same 
category with Gideon.”75 Whereas Gideon effected “a profound and 
sweeping change,”76 Crawford lacks that “primacy” and “centrality.”77 
Because the Court had already decided the case based on the first 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1183. 
 73. Id. (quoting Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1028 (9th Cir. 2005) (Wallace, J., 
concurring and dissenting)). 
 74. Id. (citing Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d at 1019). 
 75. Id. at 1184. 
 76. Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
 77. Id. (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)). 
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exception, it did not elaborate on its determination that Crawford 
does not equal Gideon in primacy. It simply held that Crawford “does 
not qualify as a rule that ‘alter[ed] our understanding of the bedrock 
procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.’”78 
In sum, despite a proliferation of briefs on both sides, and a fair 
amount of commentary suggesting that this might finally be the case 
to find a rule retroactive, the Court issued a remarkably 
unremarkable decision. The opinion was a straightforward application 
of Teague and its progeny, holding simply that “Crawford announced 
a ‘new rule’ of criminal procedure and that this rule does not fall 
within the Teague exception for watershed rules.”79 
IV.  ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION: THE WATERSHED EXCEPTION 
AFTER BOCKTING 
Due in part to its simplicity, Whorton v. Bockting goes a long way 
in clarifying the standards for retroactive application of new rules of 
criminal procedure. From the Court’s decision, one can deduce a 
number of relevant rules for retroactivity analysis. 
First, on the question of whether a rule is new or not, the relevant 
inquiry is whether it was dictated by prior precedent. This part of the 
Court’s opinion did not break any new ground, but it did clarify that, 
when considering whether a rule is a break from precedent, courts 
must look to the rationale behind the previous decisions, not at the 
results of those decisions. 
More importantly, with regard to the question of whether a new 
rule is watershed, the Court clarified that the rule must both be 
necessary to prevent an unacceptable risk of an inaccurate conviction 
and alter our understanding of bedrock procedural elements 
necessary to a fair trial. For each avenue of inquiry, the yardstick is 
Gideon. A new rule must be equally necessary to prevent inaccurate 
convictions as is Gideon and it must be just as groundbreaking in its 
effect on our understanding of bedrock procedures. This is a long yard 
indeed. 
The Court devoted the most attention to the first requirement, 
that the rule be necessary to prevent inaccurate convictions. 
 
 78. Id. (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990)). 
 79. Id. 
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Importantly, the Court stressed that the question is not whether there 
is some measurable gain in accuracy derived from the new rule, but 
rather whether the old rule, if continually applied, would result in an 
impermissibly large risk of inaccurate fact-finding. Henceforth, any 
defendant attempting to have a new rule retroactively applied will 
have to show that the rule under which he was convicted seriously 
diminishes the accuracy of not only his trial, but the criminal 
proceeding in the universal sense. This is an exceedingly high 
standard, as it is difficult to imagine a procedural rule that has so 
great a tendency to produce inaccurate results and yet has been 
applied by the courts for however many decades prior to the new 
rule’s announcement. 
Even if a case that passed the accuracy prong were to surface, it 
would still have to meet the bedrock requirement before constituting 
a watershed rule. Bockting requires that the defendant prove that the 
new rule itself constitutes a “previously unrecognized bedrock 
procedural element that is essential to the fairness of a proceeding.”80 
It is difficult to conceive of how a rule can be both new (that is, a rule 
that had not been recognized for over two hundred years) and yet 
also “bedrock” at the same time. Here the Court offered little 
guidance, because it had already decided the case based on the 
accuracy prong of the watershed test. It suggested again that Gideon 
is the guidepost, and that the new rule must as be “sweeping” and 
“profound,” as that landmark case, but did not explain why Crawford 
was not. Suffice it to say, though, that if Crawford—which had a 
profound effect on the manner in which criminal trials are managed—
does not amount to a landmark decision, few if any cases will. It is this 
skepticism that seems to be the subtext of the entire decision: no new 
rule of criminal procedure will ever be “watershed enough” to satisfy 
the Court’s retroactivity rules. 
 
 80. Id. at 1183. 
